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ADDITIONAL ARTICLES
THE “EYE OF THE BEHOLDER”: PROFESSIONAL OPINIONS ABOUT
THE BEST INTERESTS OF A CHILD
Noel Semple
Child custody evaluations (CCEs) are a central feature of parenting litigation in many North American jurisdictions. However,
there has been little recent research comparing CCE decisions about children’s interests with decisions made by judges. This
article presents empirical research about the extent to which Ontario judges accept custody and access recommendations from
CCEs employed by Ontario’s Office of the Children’s Lawyer. The central finding was that the judges fully agreed with the
CCEs only about half of the time. Possible explanations for this finding are explored, the most salient of which is the effect of
delay in Ontario family litigation. In conclusion, the article suggests that a more efficient synthesis of the judicial and CCE
decision-making processes might be more consonant with the best interests of children involved in these disputes.
Keywords: child custody evaluations; family court; custody and visitation; custody and access; joint custody; social work;
judicial decision-making; Office of the Children’s Lawyer
Because resolving private parenting disputes using the “best interests of the child” standard is a
daunting challenge for legal decision-makers, they often turn to non-lawyers for input. While judges
retain the final authority, neutral child custody evaluators are now part of the process in many
Western jurisdictions. These experts have important fact-finding, therapeutic, and settlement-
inducing roles.1 However, they are usually also asked to identify the parenting arrangement which
would be in the best interests of the child.2 This article reports on empirical research based on
custody and access (visitation) recommendations made by social workers from Ontario’s Office of
the Children’s Lawyer (OCL), and the extent to which judges follow these recommendations.3 The
central finding was that the courts followed only 52% of the recommendations in the reported cases
used for this study.fcre_1412 760..775
This article begins by introducing the judicial decision-making process for Ontario custody and
access cases. It then describes the OCL, and the process by which social workers from this agency
decide what to recommend in these cases. The next part reports the central empirical finding, and
then compares it with results from prior reported studies of judicial concurrence with child custody
evaluations. In addition, it examines a secondary data set of recommendations made by OCL
lawyers for children. Both of these other data sets indicated much higher rates of judicial concur-
rence than that of the central finding, and the next part explores possible explanation s for this
divergence. Delay in Ontario’s family courts appears to be the most compelling explanation.
Finally, the next part of this article will review the normative literature about judicial and non-
judicial decision-making in private parenting disputes. This article concludes by asking whether
children might be well-served by a process which more harmoniously synthesizes investigation and
litigation.
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JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKINGABOUT CUSTODYANDACCESS IN ONTARIO
All judicial custody and access decisions in Ontario are to be made on the basis of “the best
interests of the child.”4 The applicable statutes list some factors relevant to this determination.5
However, these factors are so broad that, according to one scholar, they “add nothing to the unwieldy
vagueness of this term as an operative legal concept.”6 The task confronting judges is, therefore, as
simple to state as it is difficult to perform – to make the order which is in the best interests of the child
or children who are the subjects of the dispute.
The statutes provide special procedural rules for custody and access litigation, including provisions
intended to reduce delay.7 Judges have the power to make orders with conditions, such as access
supervision by a third party. They cannot, however, delegate their decision-making powers.8 Further
orders can be made at a later time if there has been a “material change in circumstances” which may
affect the child(ren)’s best interests.9 Custody and access matters in Ontario are always heard by a
judge alone, without a jury.10
The most important procedural feature distinguishing custody and access litigation from other
litigation is the court’s authority to call on non-judicial experts for help in resolving the case. For
example, judges can appoint mediators in the hopes of inducing settlement, or request the OCL’s
involvement.11 In the absence of OCL participation, the court can appoint an expert to assess and
report, even without the parties’ request or consent.12 Parties can be ordered to attend for the
evaluation, and negative inferences can be drawn if they refuse to do so.13 All the same, the jurispru-
dence regarding the circumstances in which a non-OCL expert will be appointed is relatively con-
servative. The leading case in Ontario requires that there be “clinical issues” at hand.14 However,
judges are generally more willing to seek assistance from the OCL than they are to order a private
sector assessment, given the publicly-funded nature of OCL interventions.
Apart from these procedural features, custody and access litigation is essentially identical to an
ordinary civil trial. In Ontario, it is rare for the child who is the subject of the litigation to either be
called as a witness or to be interviewed by the judge in a custody or access proceeding.15 Each party
has the right to make opening and closing submissions, to call evidence, and to cross-examine the
adversary. Recent estimates suggest that anywhere between 35% and 70% of Ontario family litigants
are unrepresented by counsel.16
THE OCL (ONTARIO)
The OCL is a branch of Ontario’s Ministry of the Attorney General. It becomes involved in certain
custody and access cases at the request of a judge,17 but it also declines a substantial proportion of
judicial requests for its involvement. When it does become involved, the OCL provides services
without charge to the parties. It can take various roles in a custody or access case, including appointing
a lawyer to represent the child(ren) in the proceeding. This research project focused on social worker
investigations, the other primary form of OCL involvement in custody and access cases. Social worker
investigations are conducted by OCL social workers pursuant to s. 112 of Ontario’s Courts of Justice
Act,18 and they produce reports with recommendations about how the court should rule.19 A very small
proportion of OCL evaluation reports are subsequently considered by courts because in most cases the
parties settle.20
How do OCL social workers decide what to recommend? The secondary literature provides some
information, and some case reports reviewed for this research also included descriptions of the OCL
investigation procedure.21 While this process is in many respects similar to those followed by psy-
chologists and psychiatrists doing custody and access evaluations, it also has certain distinguishing
features.
OCL social workers, like judges, seek the best interest of the child, and feel free to recommend
any order that is within the court’s power. The investigative process requires 20-35 hours of work,
over the course of two to four months.22 The process generally begins with the basic information
provided in court records and the parties’ affidavits.23 Interviews with the parents and the child(ren)
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are at the core of the investigation.24 Parents and children are interviewed on multiple occasions
over time. Children are interviewed in their parents’ homes, and in some cases at school. Tech-
niques such as structured play, drawing pictures, and story-telling are sometimes used with children
to facilitate discussions about their feelings.25 A child might be asked to provide a rationale for a
voluntarily expressed opinion about a parent. Such techniques obtain the child’s input while
seeking to avoid the consequences of asking children to choose between their parents, an approach
which is considered inappropriate.26
Another central part of the process is the observation of interactions between parents and chil-
d(ren), often in the home environment. Additionally, the social worker usually considers “collateral”
sources of information other than the child(ren) and the parents. Collateral sources may include
schools or daycares, supervised access centers, children’s aid societies, relatives and partners of the
parties, health-care professionals, or the police.27 These sources permit cross-checking of information
provided by the parties and child(ren), a process known as “triangulation.”28
Social work evaluations have been described as “naturalistic” and grounded in observations,
producing reports in which the parties’ and child(ren)’s wishes are visible in the report, along with the
evaluator’s recommendation.29 The OCL social worker’s investigation is verified at certain points by
his or her peers and superiors.30 There is usually a meeting with the parties to disclose the contents of
the report before it is filed with the court.31 Disputes often settle at or shortly after these disclosure
meetings.32
The OCL social worker investigation process has much in common with evaluations conducted by
psych-professionals. All of these professionals seek to remain neutral while gathering information
from multiple sources via multiple methods, including interviews, observations, and collateral
sources.33 However, there are also important distinguishing features of the publicly- funded social
worker investigations. Subjecting parents to psychological tests is common in psychologist/
psychiatrist evaluations, but OCL social workers do not appear to use these tests.34 Social worker
investigations tend to require less time,35 and are generally more fact-intensive and less diagnostic
than those of psychologists and psychiatrists.36 Some authors report that social workers are more likely
to conduct home visits.37 In sum, the available evidence suggests that OCL social worker evaluations
are a distinct process for making decisions about children’s best interests. They have little in common





How often do Ontario courts concur with custody and access recommendations from the OCL?
To address this research question, this author analyzed custody and access cases from 2003 through
2008 (i) which were reported in the LexisNexis Quicklaw database, and (ii) in which the OCL made
a recommendation about the ultimate issue which was ascertainable from the case report.38 The
database query results were scanned to identify reported recommendations from OCL social workers
about what custody or access decision should be made. If a judicial decision on the issue was
reported, the OCL recommendation and the judicial decision were included in the database. Where
an OCL recommendation was followed by multiple rounds of litigation and multiple judicial deci-
sions about the same child(ren), only the earliest available judicial decision was considered.39 In all,
151 such pairs of recommendation and decision were identified, from 94 different cases. In coding
the findings in these cases, the research used the current Canadian legal definitions of custody and
access, as follows:
1. Custody Concurrence. “Legal custody” is defined in Ontario’s common law as the power to
make decisions on behalf of a child.40 The Children’s Law Reform Act (“CLRA”) provides that “a
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person entitled to custody of a child has the rights and responsibilities of a parent in respect of the
person of the child and must exercise those rights and responsibilities in the best interests of the
child.”41 Legal custody can be either “sole” decision-making authority (held by one adult) or “joint”
(held by two adults). Legal custody is theoretically distinct from “physical custody,” which gener-
ally means the right to live with and have authority over the child. However, Ontario courts usually
simply award sole or joint custody without using the adjectives “legal” or “physical.” If an award
of sole custody over a child is made to an individual, that individual is understood to have both
legal and physical custody rights, except insofar as those rights are limited by an access or other
order of the court. An award of joint custody usually means that physical custody will be split
according to a court-ordered schedule.42 Legal decision-making power regarding quotidian issues
will rest with the parent who has physical custody at the time when the decision is to be made.
However, in a joint custody regime, legal decision-making power regarding one or more larger
issues (such as the right to determine the child’s religion) may be given to a certain parent per-
manently.43 The Custody Concurrence field in the database was coded “1” if the judgment of the
court concurred with an OCL recommendation about legal custody, and “0” if it disagreed.
2. Access Concurrence. “Access,” in Ontario, means the right of a person without custody rights
to spend time with a child and to receive information about the “health, education and welfare” of that
child.44 This research project recorded the degree to which the outcome of a case reflected the OCL
recommendation about access, if any. However, because in most cases the final court order differed in
some way from the recommendation, but did not reject it outright, the following five values were used
to code this field:
• “Full Concurrence” represented total court concurrence with the OCL access recommendation.
If the OCL recommended X hours per year of access, and the court ordered X hours, then the
case was coded “Full Concurrence,” regardless of whether there was concurrence regarding the
other details of access.
• “General Concurrence” meant that the OCL recommendation and the court-ordered schedule
were more similar than different in terms of the total quantity of hours. If the OCL recom-
mended a certain number of access hours per year, and the court ordered more than half as many
as the OCL recommended, but less than twice as many, then the case was coded “General
Concurrence.”
• “General Disagreement” indicated that the two were more different than they were similar. It
was used if the OCL recommended a certain number of hours per year but the court ordered less
than half as many, or more than twice as many.
• “Total Disagreement” meant total rejection of the OCL access recommendation.
• “Consistency” meant that, based on the information in the case report, the court order was
generally consistent with the OCL recommendation. However, in these cases, there was insuf-
ficient information in the case report to determine the degree of concurrence with any greater
precision.
3. Joint-Custody Recommendations: Time-Sharing Concurrence. As observed above, a court
ordering joint custody generally creates a schedule establishing which parent has physical custody of
the child(ren) at any given point in time. In a large number of cases, the OCL made recommendations
about the contents of this schedule. Where the OCL recommended joint legal custody and this
recommendation was accepted, and where joint legal custody was the uncontested status quo, the
results were recorded using the same five values described in the “Access Concurrence” field above.
This field was also used when the OCL’s joint custody recommendation was not accepted.
In these cases, if the court’s allocation of the child’s time was as close as possible to what the
OCL recommended, given that it had rejected the joint custody recommendation, then the case was
coded “Full Concurrence” in this field. If the OCL recommended joint custody with primary resi-
dence to parent X, and sole custody was awarded to parent X, the case was coded “Consistent” in
this field.45
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FINDINGS
“Percentage Rate of Agreement,” for access and time-sharing recommendations, was calculated by
adding cases coded “Consistency” to those coded “Total Concurrence,” and dividing the result by the
total number of recommendations. It is possible that in some of the “Consistent” cases, there was some
disagreement not recorded in the case report. In some of the “General Concurrence” cases, the
court-ordered outcome was very similar to that which the OCL recommended. These cases were
included among the cases of disagreement because most past studies of judicial concurrence with
evaluators’ access and time-sharing recommendations appear to have classified any case in which
there is any divergence between recommendation and ruling as one of “Disagreement.”46 Using the
same methodology facilitates comparison of the present findings to those from past studies.
In 37% of the cases in which the social worker made a custody recommendation, the recommen-
dation was for joint custody. The following table demonstrates that OCL recommendations of joint
custody were less likely to be accepted by judges than sole custody recommendations:
To determine whether there is a statistically significant difference between rates of judicial con-
currence with sole custody and joint custody recommendations, the author conducted a chi-square
test. A level of statistical significance of .05 was chosen, meaning that the author would assume that
the difference in rates of concurrence occurred by chance unless the statistical test indicated a 95%
likelihood that this was not the case. On this standard, the null hypothesis (that judges are equally
likely to accept the two kinds of recommendation) can be rejected.48
As noted above, the OCL can alternatively intervene in a custody and access cases by appointing
counsel to represent the child.49 In these cases, the child’s counsel is present at trial, and able to argue
a position. The sample included 39 recommendations from OCL-appointed lawyers, in 31 cases from
the same 2003-2008 time period. As the following table indicates, the overall rate of judicial concur-
rence with these recommendations was 83%, compared to 52% concurrence with social worker
recommendations.50
Table 1







Number made 77 46 28
Total concurrence 42 8 5
Consistency 16 7
General Concurrence 12 9
General Disagreement 9 7
Total disagreement 35 1 0
Percentage rate of agreement 55% 52% 43%
Overall average rate of concurrence: 52%
Table 2





% of All Soc. Worker
Custody Recommendations




Joint Custody 28 37% 9 32%
Sole Custody47 48 63% 32 67%
764 FAMILY COURT REVIEW
LIMITATIONS
While the researcher’s choice to focus on case reports rather than written evaluations had advan-
tages, it also gave rise to limitations. First, the case reports provided very limited information about
the content of the OCL reports which contained the recommendations. Analysis of the assessments
with which judges disagreed might have revealed reasons why they were not followed. Examination
of these documents might also show that certain investigatory or reporting techniques were correlated
with higher or lower rates of concurrence.
Second, the Quicklaw database does not include every case issued by Ontario’s courts, and one of
the limitations of this research is the possibility that the sample was not representative of the
population. For example, it is possible that (i) Quicklaw is more likely to include longer cases, and (ii)
cases in which the court concurs with the OCL recommendation are more likely to be shorter.
However, as the portions of the cases addressing the OCL recommendations were often quite short, the
latter of these postulates is certainly not proven. In general, Quicklaw does include a broad cross-
section from all parts of the province.52
Third, there were also a number of cases in which the reasons mentioned the existence of an OCL
s. 112 report, but did not indicate what, if any, recommendations were made in the report. These cases
reduce the representativeness of the research sample. Finally, nothing can be learned from my data set
about the impact of OCL recommendations in the majority of cases which settle without reported
adjudication. If the cases that go to trial are the most “difficult” cases, then they may be more likely
to produce outcomes divergent from the OCL’s recommendations.
COMPARING ANDANALYZING THE RESEARCH RESULTS
It is important not to exaggerate the differences in opinion between judges and OCL social workers.
In a large number of the cases analyzed, the judgment explicitly praised the work of the social worker.
It was often noted that the report and/or testimony were balanced or objective.53 In numerous other
cases it was remarked that they were helpful to the court.54 In a few others, the judgment describes
approvingly the OCL professional’s experience or credentials.55 Even in cases where the OCL’s
recommendations were rejected, judges sometimes commended the report as a source of evidence
about the child’s views and preferences or other relevant issues.56
However, the 52% overall concurrence rate remains quite low in the context of the existing
literature. Most research about child custody and access evaluations involves those done by psychia-
trists or psychologists, rather than social workers. These studies have consistently found that judges
accept over 90% of the recommendations. Brun et al. studied 119 Danish cases from 1975 and 1976
in which child psychiatrists and psychologists made recommendations.57 In only six custody cases and
Table 3







Number made 20 14 5
Total Concurrence 17.3351 9 4
Consistent 2 0
General Concurrence 2 0
General Disagreement 1 1
Total Disagreement 2.66 0 0
Percentage Rate of Full Concurrence 87% 79% 80%
Overall Average Rate of Full Concurrence: 83%
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three access cases did the judicial authority make an order contrary to the recommendation. Although
the research report leaves some ambiguity about how many of the cases actually reached a final
adjudication, the rate of concurrence was at least 92%. Similarly, Ash and Guyer analyzed 119
American cases from 1978 in which the University of Michigan child psychiatry service provided
evaluation reports in contested custody/access cases.58 They found that 92% of court dispositions
matched the evaluator’s recommendation regarding custody, and 89% matched with regard to visita-
tion (access). Moreover, in approximately one-third of the cases in which the court order and the
evaluator’s recommendation did not concur, the court order reflected a settlement which had been
reached by the parties after the evaluation.
Thery identified 33 cases from 1981 in Paris in which a judicial decision about custody or access
was made, following an intervention by a social worker or psychiatrist. The recommendation was
followed by the court in every one of these cases.59 In 1989, Tobin analyzed 92 cases in which
clinicians at a Toronto psychiatric institution had made recommendations about custody outcomes. Of
the 62 cases in which the judicial ruling was recorded, the judge concurred with the clinician in 60 of
them (96.7% concurrence). In the other two, the parties reached an agreement after the evaluation,
which affected the ruling.60 While quantifiable data for the period after 1990 is more difficult to find,
qualitative reports suggest that “neutral” recommendations continue to have a powerful impact on
judicial outcomes.61
Most of these prior studies did not involve Ontario and did not involve social worker recommen-
dations, so they cannot be directly compared to the findings of the present research. However, it is of
note that they all found rates of judicial concurrence in excess of 90%. A similarly high concurrence
rate (83%) was found in the secondary data set generated by the present research, consisting of
recommendations from OCL lawyers.62
These results lead to two questions. First, why were OCL social worker recommendations accepted
by judges only 52% of the time, significantly less often than recommendations from psychologists and
psychiatrists in other jurisdictions, and significantly less often than the recommendations of OCL
lawyers in Ontario? Second, why were social worker joint custody recommendations accepted even
less often, only 32% of the time?
DELAY
The divergence between these results from Ontario and the results from other jurisdictions in
prior studies could reflect an Ontario-specific factor, and delay is a likely candidate. Among the 94
cases with social worker recommendations from a s. 112 report, the case report indicated the dates
of the OCL recommendations in 63 cases. In these cases, an average of 1.08 years elapsed between
the report and the date of the judgment on the same issue. It is possible that these 63 cases are not
an entirely representative sample with regard to time elapsed between recommendation and judg-
ment, because judges were probably more likely to specify the date if a longer period of time had
elapsed. This conclusion is based on the assumption that judges would see a longer delay as weak-
ening the probative value of the report, and would therefore be more likely to mention the period
elapsed in these cases.
Nonetheless, an average of 1.08 years elapssing in two-thirds of the cases suggests that there is
very often a substantial period of delay before OCL recommendations are judicially considered. In
18 cases, the court either specifically called attention to the passage of time since the report, or
observed that facts had changed since the report was filed.63 Indeed, in several cases, after the first
social worker report was filed, an update or a fresh report was prepared because the first one had
become stale-dated.64
These findings reflect the phenomenon of delay in Ontario family litigation, which has been
extensively documented.65 The findings also reflect the fact that two parties will often come to court
many times with regard to the same child(ren). Often, the later court appearances will consider an
OCL report prepared prior to an earlier appearance. The OCL’s investigative process ends when the
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report is written, so even where the social worker appears at trial, he or she is often working with very
old facts. Given how quickly children’s circumstances and needs may change, it is clear that insights
about their best interests can go stale quickly.
Does the length of the delay between recommendation and adjudication predict whether the
recommendation will be accepted or rejected? Within this subset of 63 cases with s. 112 reports and
delay data, there were 54 custody recommendations. Among these, in cases in which the date of the
report was recorded and a social worker custody recommendation was rejected by the court, an
average of 1.22 years had elapsed between the report and judgment. By contrast, when a custody
recommendation was accepted, an average of 0.90 years had elapsed.66
Within the cases with s. 112 reports and delay data, there were also 36 access/time-sharing
recommendations. When the judge was in full or “General Disagreement” with the recommendation,
an average of 1.36 years had passed.67 When there was “General Concurrence”, the average was 0.92
years.When there was “Full Concurrence” or “Consistency”, only 0.82 years had passed on average.68
Further evidence that delay may have an effect on concurrence comes from the secondary data set
involving OCL lawyer recommendations, which as explained above had significantly higher concur-
rence. These recommendations were made at the trial, not beforehand, and they therefore drew upon
more up-to-date facts and observations.69 Thus, the fact that OCL lawyer recommendations were more
up-to-date and more likely to be accepted may suggest that delay is a significant factor in explaining
the low rate of concurrence with social worker recommendations.70
CONTENT OF RECOMMENDATIONS: JOINT CUSTODY
Social worker joint custody recommendations were accepted less than 30% of the time, contrib-
uting substantially to the low overall concurrence rate of 52%. There are two apparent reasons why
judges might be less receptive to joint custody recommendations. First, it may be that social workers
and judges have fundamentally different attitudes about joint custody, although there was little
evidence for this in the judgments.
Second, the low concurrence with joint custody recommendations may be another consequence of
delay. As previously observed, the moment of judicial decision was usually many months after the
moment of OCL recommendation. If two parties fail to settle in the period after the recommendation
and if they pursue the litigation to the point of judicial decision, those facts augur against joint
custody. They suggest that the parties will have difficulty communicating and cooperating after the
order is made, and courts hold that joint custody is not in the child’s best interests if the parents can’t
get along well enough to make it work.71 According to this theory, judges took into account the
passage of time without settlement after OCL joint custody recommendations, and discounted those
recommendations for that reason. By contrast, the passage of time without settlement would not erode
the justification for a sole custody recommendation in the absence of other factual changes. This
theory would also suggest that the reason why OCL lawyer recommended sole custody so much more
often than OCL social workers did may be that lawyers were making those recommendations at trial,
a point substantially later in the life span of the dispute than the point at which the social workers made
their recommendations.
JUDICIAL ATTITUDES REGARDING SOCIALWORKER RECOMMENDATIONS
A third possible explanation for the low rate of judicial concurrence with OCL social worker
recommendations is that judges are not as willing to act on advice from social workers, as opposed to
advice from psychologists, psychiatrists, or lawyers representing children.72 Further research in the
form of a comparison of OCL social worker assessments with these other assessments might indicate
why this is the case. The social workers’ reports might be less convincing to judges than those written
by other professionals.73 Moreover, OCL social workers, by contrast to psychologists, do not usually
have doctoral-level credentials. This might undermine their authority in judges’ eyes. Judicial per-
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ceptions of social workers might explain why their recommendations were less often accepted than
both (i) recommendations from psychologists and psychiatrists in prior studies, and (ii) OCL lawyer
recommendations in the present study.
Although research into social worker recommendations is relatively sparse, one study suggests that
these evaluations may attract lower judicial concurrence rates than psychologists’ evaluations. Leah
Horvath and her colleagues identified 94 Kentucky cases with neutral recommendations about custody
or access; social workers authored 72.55% of the evaluations studied in the sample, and psychologists
were responsible for the remainder.74 In only 27.3% of the cases was the judicial decision on custody
or access identical to the recommendation.75 On the other hand, Hung-En Liu found that in Taiwanese
custody and access cases a number of “judges claimed they almost always decided in accordance with
the social workers’ conclusions.”76 Judicial attitudes about social workers might help explain the low
rate of concurrence, but further research is required to comprehensively test this theory.
BEST INTERESTS DECISION-MAKING: SOCIALWORKERS AND JUDGES
This paper first reported an empirical research finding – a rate of evaluator/judge concurrence in
Ontario which is very low in the context of prior research. It then proposed an explanation. While
judicial attitudes may play a role, the phenomenon of delay in Ontario family courts seems to largely
account for both the low overall concurrence and the fact that OCL joint custody recommendations are
even less likely to be accepted. What, if any, normative or policy conclusions should be drawn from
these findings? Delay is partially a consequence of resource scarcity, and an infusion of new resources
to the OCL and Ontario’s family courts might substantially address this problem.
The best interests of children might also be served by a more harmonious synthesis between
evaluator decision-making and judicial decision-making. For example, whereas the cases studied for
this article each had two decision-makers (evaluator and judge), there might be advantages in a system
with only one decision-maker per case. A “synthesis system” of this nature might more efficiently
utilize existing resources, and address problems such as delay which are created in part by the
interface between two decision-making processes. A synthesis system could combine the best ele-
ments of judicial and non-judicial decision-making in a single decision-maker.
A necessarily prior question arises. What are the strengths and weaknesses of these two types of
decision-making in the context of custody and access disputes? Scholars have made compelling
arguments for both approaches.
THE CASE FOR JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING
Most of the existing literature takes for granted that judges will always remain the final decision-
makers, and focuses critically on custody and access evaluations. For example, in theApril 2009 issue
of the Family Court Review, Robert Kelly and Sarah Ramsey propose a research agenda designed to
comprehensively evaluate the contribution of evaluations to custody and access decision-making.77 In
a subsequent article of that issue, Mary O’Connell endorses this agenda, adding “the legal system
must also clarify the justification for imposing this extensive—and often expensive—intrusion into
the privacy of parents.”78
A number of scholars have argued that, even if non-judicial experts have a role in providing
evidence, only judges should make the decisions.79 Some authors and judges not only reject the use
of expert recommendations as to the ultimate issue in custody and access proceedings, but also
reject any participation by these experts at all.80 A portion of this criticism focuses on the activities
of psychologists and psychiatrists.81 For example, they have been accused of abandoning the scien-
tific process by stating conclusions with a degree of certainty which is not justified by their obser-
vations or by legitimate inferences therefrom.82 This mischief is exacerbated if the opinion is
misleadingly represented or perceived as having the objective authority of “science.”83 Other criti-
cisms are aimed at party-retained experts, but have no force against neutrals such as OCL social
workers.84
768 FAMILY COURT REVIEW
Nonetheless, many of the arguments in the literature can be applied to social workers. For example,
some critics argue that custody evaluators are vulnerable to “unsubstantiated theory, personal values
and experiences . . . cultural and personal biases, [and] biased perception of their clients derived from
their own negative marital and divorce experiences.”85 Of course, given the inherent difficulty which
any decision-maker confronts in trying to predict a child’s best interests, the same criticism might be
leveled at judges. However, Martha Fineman argued that the litigation process provides a form of
insulation from personal decision-maker bias which an investigatory process cannot.86 As a result, she
recommended limiting the “helping professions” to making determinations about whether a particular
adult is “unfit” to be a parent, precluding them from opining about which parent is “better.”87 Writing
in 1983, Foster and Freed claimed that
[a] sacrifice of legal principles and protections is too dear a price to pay for a mess of pottage. At times it
is too dangerous to human liberty to listen too attentively to the experts. In addition to juvenile court
justice, witness the fad of sterilization and the institutionalization of so-called sex psychopaths. Nonethe-
less, there is a growing demand that we repeat the same folly and turn the resolution of child custody
disputes over to the ‘experts.’88
Turning to the case reports analyzed in this research project, one finds judges echoing some of
these arguments. The OCL’s work was explicitly criticized in at least eight cases out of the 90 with
social worker recommendations. The most common criticism, which appeared in at least six cases,
was that the OCL representative should have talked to more people or gathered more collateral
information.89 A related concern, which was voiced in two judgments, was that the OCL relied on
biased statements from the parties or their allies, without corroboration.90 Other occasional criticisms
were that the OCL worker was biased,91 that he or she did not give due weight to stated wishes of the
child,92 that there was no rationale given for the recommendation,93 and that there was insufficient
correspondence between the social worker’s notes and the content of the report.94
Some scholars have argued that judgments about the best interests of a child have dimensions
which only judges can appreciate. Lynn Akre suggested that these decisions involve “moral and legal
judgments,” which must by their nature remain the province of the judiciary.95 Similarly, Gould and
Martindale distinguished between “psychological best interests of the child” and the “best interests of
the child simpliciter,” which is the legal standard.96 While the former is the legitimate domain of
non-legal experts, the latter is “based both on the law, that is outside the competence of most mental
health professionals, and on common-sense judgments, that are properly reserved for the judge.”97
Tippins and Wittman also saw “critically important boundaries between the person invested with the
power to make socio-moral and social-control decisions (the judge) and the expert witness who is
hired to assist the court.”98 For this reason, they argued that psychologists and psychiatrists (and,
presumably, social workers) should not make outcome recommendations to the court in custody and
access disputes. Writing about the Canadian context, Professor Bala claimed that “the determination
of a child’s ‘best interests’ always involves application of a legal standard,” and therefore an expert
“assessment does not provide a definitive answer on the question of what is in the child’s best
interests.”99
THE CASE FOR SOCIAL-WORKER DECISION-MAKING
In addition to issues about the accuracy of expert evaluations, the literature clearly demonstrates
a concern that non-judicial experts not intrude on a decision-making function which ought to be
reserved for judges. However, it does not clearly identify the specifically legal or moral element of the
“best interests of a child” standard, nor does it convincingly explain the utility of legal training in
making these decisions. Judges themselves have expressed skepticism about their role in this context.
One Ontario family court judge was quoted in the Lawyers’ Weekly complaining that “so little of our
work involves genuine legal issues to be truly adjudicated . . . I feel that I am more a social worker
than a judge.”100 Another judge began a recent access decision as follows:
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Some day, a wise person in a position of authority will realize that a court of law is not the best forum for
deciding custody and access disputes, where principles of common sense masquerade as principles of law.
Implementing the best-interests-of-the-child precept requires objectivity, not a legal education.101
It is arguable that some of the most powerful intellectual skills at a judge’s disposal are of
substantially diminished utility in custody and access decision-making. Statutory interpretation is not
particularly useful when the statutes simply call for the child’s “best interests” to be promoted, and
then offer an anodyne list of factors, all of which are obviously good for children. Precedents are
seldom of much use; citations of case law were rare in the cases analyzed.102 Even if there is a helpful
precedent, given the high rates of self-representation, there is often no lawyer in the courtroom able
to bring it to the judge’s attention.
It has been argued that litigation is ideally suited to analyzing the past. It excels in finding historical
facts and making legal deductions about them.103 Custody and access decision-making, by contrast,
requires identifying the plan for an uncertain future which is most likely to further a child’s inter-
ests.104 Decision-makers must predict how family members will interact under a variety of hypotheti-
cal scenarios, a function for which judges are not necessarily well suited.105 Vilhelm Auber put this
point as follows:
[A judge] is not a planner or an executor of plans. We can see here a close relationship between the nature
of legal thinking, relatively unconcerned with utilitarian planning for the future, and the type of decision-
making delegated to the judiciary. There is a close correspondence between his way of thinking and the fact
that he is without command of the resources which other decision-makers, who must shape the future
according to scientific plans, must control.106
Judicial decision-making about custody and access is also compromised by weak evidence. It is
striking that, in a proceeding focused on the best interests of a child, the judge usually has no direct
access to the child’s evidence. In the absence of participation by neutral experts, judges are generally
confined to hearing about the child’s wishes as hearsay via the parents or their legal representatives.
The only alternatives are for the child to testify in court or be interviewed by the judge. Neither of
these things happens often in Ontario courts.107 There is therefore a stark disjunction between the
intellectual task of adjudicating a custody or access dispute and the evidence and argument upon
which the judge must rely to do so. The former is all about the child, whereas the latter comes mostly
or entirely from the parents, who have no legal interest or rights in the outcome.108
There are also serious issues about the adult parties’ evidence, since judges must evaluate them as
potential parents based on their testimony in open court. A person’s behavior in this formal and often
stressful environment may be a poor indicator of how he or she is likely to behave while alone with
the child. By contrast, OCL social workers are empowered and trained to interview children, visit the
parties’ homes, and deploy an arsenal of information-gathering techniques much broader than that
offered by the rules of civil procedure. It is at least possible that, all in all, OCL custody and access
recommendations are based on better information than judicial decisions.
CONCLUSION: A SYNTHESIS SYSTEM?
One possible synthesis system would entrust social worker evaluators with the final decision-
making authority in custody and access cases. A few commentators have suggested that non-judges
should sit in panels with judges, jointly exercising authority.109 Outside of North America, there is
some precedent for non-judicial final decision-making in custody and access disputes.110Alternatively,
family court judges might be given some of the investigatory powers and responsibilities which are
currently held by evaluators. While one can imagine judges visiting homes and daycares before
making custody decisions, an intermediate and more realistic reform would be mandating or encour-
aging in-chambers judicial interviews with the children involved.111
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There is also, of course, something to be said for preserving the role distinctions between those
who investigate and those who decide.112 A comprehensive analysis of these considerations and
options is clearly beyond the scope of this article.113 However, it is hoped that the empirical findings
about concurrence and delay presented here will contribute to this important debate about the process
we use to identify and pursue the best interests of our children.
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